Reading Group

On “Chance and Conditionals” (2013-14: final version April 5, 2014)


This reading group will run on most alternate Tuesdays 11.00-12.30 in room 243, Senate House, Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, Malet Street (see map attached)


Convenors: Prof. Mauricio Suarez, Marie Curie Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, 32 Russell Square, London WC1B 5DN, UK; and Dr. Luke Glynn, Lecturer in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Gower Street, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK.


Contact person:  Mauricio Suarez (Email: or Phone: +44 (0) 207862 8640).


Schedule (2013-14)

15 October 2013

Handfield and Wilson, “Chance and Context”


29 October 2013 (coinciding with Dorothy Edgington’s evening seminar)

Roberts, “Chance without Credence”


5 November 2013

Ismael, “Probability in Deterministic Physics”, “A Modest Proposal about Chance”


26 November 2013 (coinciding with Philip Dawid’s evening seminar)

Dawid, “Counterfactuals, Hypotheticals and Potential Responses”


10 December 2013 (coinciding with Richard Bradley’s evening seminar)

Skyrms, “Resiliency, Propensities and Causal Necessity”; “Statistical Laws and Personal Propensities”


28 January 2014 (coinciding with Luke Glynn’s evening seminar)

Frigg and Hoefer, “Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics”


11 February 2014

Hitchcock, “Cause and Chance”


25 February 2014 (coinciding with Charlotte Werndl’s evening seminar)

Fitelson and Hitchcock, “Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength”


11 March 2014

Ismael, “Raid!” and Briggs, “The Big Bad Bug Bites Anti-Realists about Chance”


25 March 2014 (coinciding with Orri Stefánsson’s evening seminar)

Pettigrew, “What Chance-Credence Norms Should not Be”, “Accuracy”


29 April 2014

Briggs, “The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug”, “The Big Bad Bug Bites Anti-Realists about Chance”


13 May 2014

Hoefer, “The third way on Objective Probability”


27 May 2014 (coinciding with Hugh Mellor’s evening seminar)

Mellor, “What Decision Theory Tells us”, “How to believe a conditional”


10 June 2014

Hawthorne, “Chance and Counterfactuals”; Williams “Chances, Counterfactuals and Similarity”



Bradley, R.: ‘Multi-Dimensional  Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals’, Phil Review (2012)

Briggs, R.: ‘The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug’, Nous (2009)

Briggs, R.: ‘The Big Bad Bug Bites Anti-Realists About Chance’, Synthese (2009)

Briggs, R.: ‘Interventionist Counterfactuals’, Phil. Studies (2012)

Contessa, G.: “Dispositions and Interferences”, Philosophical Studies (2103)

Dawid, A. P. (2007). Counterfactuals, hypotheticals and potential responses: a philosophical examination of statistical causality. In Causality and Probability in the Sciences, edited by F. Russo and J. Williamson. London: College Publications, Texts In Philosophy Series Vol. 5, 503-32.

Fitelson, B. and C. Hitchcock: “Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength”, ms.

Frigg, R. And C. Hoefer: “The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics”, Erkenntnis, forthcoming.
Handfield, T. and Wilson, A: “Chance and Context”, ms.

Hajek, A.: “Staying regular”, ms.

Hawthorne, J. “Chance and Counterfactuals”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 2.

Hitchcock, C.: “Cause and Chance”, ms.

Hartmann & Rad: ‘Updating on Conditionals = Kullback-Leibler + Causal Structure’ (ms.)

Hoefer, C.: “The Third Way on Objective Probability”, Mind (2007)

Ismael, J.: ‘A Modest Proposal About Chance’, J. Phil. (2012)

Ismael, J.: “Probability in Deterministic Physics”, J. Phil (2009)

Ismael, J.: ‘Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug’, Nous (2008)

Meacham: ‘Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle’, BJPS (2010)

Mellor, H: extracts from Mind, Meaning and Reality

Milne, P.: “Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities , and the Defective truth-table”, Thinking & Reasoning (2012).

Nathan, M.: “A Simulacrum Account of Dispositional Properties” Nous (2013)

Pettigrew, R.: ‘Accuracy, chance, and the Principal Principle’, Phil. Review (2012)

Pettigrew: ‘What Chance-Credence Norms Should Not Be’ (ms.)

Price, H.: ‘Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence’, Phil. Review (2012)

Roberts, J.T. “Chance without Credence”, BJPS (2013)

Skyrms, B. “Resiliency, Propensities and Causal Necessity”, Journal of Philosophy (1977)

Skyrms, B. “Statistical Laws and Personal Probabilities”, Philosophy of Science Proceedings (1978)

Steinberg, J. R.: “Dispositions and Subjunctives”, Philosophical Studies (2010)

Williams, R. “Chances, Counterfactuals and Similarity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 2. 385-420.